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The Role of Recklessness in American Systems
of Comparative Fault
Confusion now hath made his masterpiece!
William Shakespeare
Macbeth. Act ii, sc. 3
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most significant change visited upon American negligence
law during the twentieth century has been the growth of comparative fault.'
Born out of a desire to ameliorate the severity of the contributory negligence
doctrine, 2 comparative fault allows a fact finder to allocate the relative de-
grees of fault attributable to the parties and to diminish the plaintiff's recovery
accordingly. Its adoption has necessitated a dramatic reworking of negligence
doctrines that arose as contributory negligence developed. These doctrines
(last clear chance,3 various degrees of negligence and recklessness) date
back almost as far as negligence itself and arose, as comparative fault, prima-
rily as a palliative of the harsh contributory negligence bar.
1. The phrase "comparative fault" is used throughout this Comment as subsuming the concept of "com-
parative negligence." "Comparative fault" is a broader term, at least arguably encompassing comparison not
only of negligence but also of other sorts of tortious conduct (e.g., recklessness, strict liability, and perhaps
even intentional conduct). A system of comparative negligence, in a strict sense, arguably would permit only the
comparison of ordinary negligence. While the difference between the two concepts is significant, especially with
respect to the treatment of recklessness, determining the appropriate label in individual cases has proven most
difficult. Most jurisdictions that have adopted systems of comparative fault, whether they have titled them
"comparative fault" or "comparative negligence," have not decided, eitherjudicially or legislatively, the extent
to which the systems will apply to types of fault other than negligence. While the use of the term "comparative
fault" throughout this Comment arguably is prejudicial (being suggestive of allowing tomparison of ordinary
negligence with recklessness), it has proved the only viable altemative: although some states today clearly have
systems of comparative fault and some clearly have systems that compare only negligence, the issue remains
unresolved in most U.S. jurisdictions. Therefore, unless the legislature or the judiciary in a particular jurisdic-
tion has made it clear that a particular system is designed to compare only negligence, the broader "comparative
fault" term will be used. The reader, however, should not discount the possibility that particular jurisdictions
will elect at a later time to restrict their comparative fault schemes to comparisons of negligence alone.
2. At common law a plaintiff's contributory negligence constituted a complete bar to recovery. Courts
quickly realized that in many instances, completely barring a contributorily-negligent plaintiff's recovery
worked a harsh injustice on plaintiffs who sought recovery against defendants who clearly were preponderant
wrongdoers. See generally Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI. - KENT L. REV. 189, 203-07
(1950), for a discussion-of attempts to mitigate the severity of the contributory negligence bar.
3. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 66 (4th ed. 1971), for a discussion of
the origin and role of the last clear chance doctrine.
4. See infra note 24.
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Recklessness, one of the doctrines affected, is called by a number of
different names (recklessness, gross negligence,5 willful 6 misconduct, wanton
misconduct, and willful and wanton misconduct) in different U.S. jurisdic-
tions. Recklessness generally is seen as the intentional doing of an act of an
unreasonable character in disregard of a risk that is known to the actor or is so
obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and is so great that
it is highly probable that harm will follow. 8 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts defines recklessness using the following language:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an
act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing
or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize,
not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another,
but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make
his conduct negligent.
9
At common law a defendant's recklessness made it impossible for him to
invoke the plaintiffs contributory negligence in order to bar the plaintiff's
recovery.'0 Naturally, a plaintiff's recklessness completely prevented him
from recovering from either a reckless or a negligent defendant."
Perhaps more so than contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and
last clear chance, recklessness has posed thorny problems for courts and
leglislatures dealing with the question of the doctrine's future under com-
parative fault. Most, if not all, of the state legislatures enacting comparative
5. Considerable difference of opinion exists with respect to the difference, if any, between gross negli-
gence and recklessness. Significant legal territory exists between intentional wrongdoing and ordinary negli-
gence, along with a fair amount of confusion about how properly to label it. Some authorities and some courts
have said that the distinct concepts of gross (or aggravated) negligence and recklessness both occupy this area.
See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 34, at 183, § 65, at 426. Other courts and other authorities appear to equate
these two concepts. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts does not mention gross negligence, but a comment to
the Restatement does refer to two types of recklessness, differentiated by the existence or nonexistence of an
appreciation by the actor of the high degree of risk involved. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500
comment a (1965).
6. Many authorities spell this word "wilful." "Willful" remains the preferred spelling. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2617 (1961). It will be used throughout this Comment.
7. The various labels that have been applied to the recklessness doctrine, particularly "willful (or willful
and wanton) misconduct" have led to considerable confusion. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE § 5.3, at 104 (1974). The term "willful" tends to suggest intentional wrongdoing, when in fact the
requisite state of mind for recklessness differs significantly from that involved in an intentional tort. At least one
court actually has equated "willful" in this context with "knowing" or "intentional." Farmers Ins. Exch. v.
Village of Hewitt, 274 Minn. 246, 257, 143 N.W.2d 230, 238 (1966) (As Professor Schwartz observes, this court
subsequently defined "willful" as "reckless" in the same case, demonstrating the inconsistency of its approach.
V. SCHWARTZ, supra § 5.3, at 104 n.29.). Most courts, however, have tended to equate willful misconduct with
wanton or reckless conduct. See 45 WORDS AND PHRASES 504-05, 528-30 (1970). Professor Schwartz has
suggested that in order to alleviate some of the confusion regarding the intent element of willful misconduct, the
doctrine might more appropriately be labeled "negligent willful misconduct." V. SCHWARTZ, supra, § 5.3, at 105.
In the interest of simplicity and uniformity, the term "recklessness" is substituted for "willful misconduct"
throughout this Comment, even in discussions of cases that employ the "willful misconduct" terminology.
8. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 34, at 185.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
10. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 34, at 184-85.
11. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 5.5, at 11.
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fault statutes have ignored the question. 2 The courts that have confronted the
issue have split on the outcome, some holding that recklessness is a bar to
recovery under comparative fault and some, perhaps a small majority, holding
that it is not." The decisions in the area, relatively few in number, have been
marked by the absence of systematic analysis of the problem. Rather, the
decisions appear somewhat result-oriented, the outcomes regarding the future
of recklessness in many instances seemingly arrived at as a consequence of,
rather than a reason for, the courts' ultimate decisions regarding who should
prevail and by what amount.
A recurring question in the opinions is whether recklessness is fault of a
different degree than ordinary negligence, or whether it amounts to fault of a
different kind altogether. Courts subscribing to the degree theory have viewed
recklessness as comparable with ordinary negligence and accordingly have
held that reckless conduct simply should be considered as an additional factor
by fact finders making determinations of comparative fault.' 4 Conversely,
courts subscribing to the theory that recklessness is a different kind of fault
altogether have held that because of this difference in kind, recklessness and
ordinary negligence are not subject to comparison under comparative neg-
ligence systems.' 5 The consequence of finding recklessness to differ in kind
from negligence is that a reckless defendant may not use the plaintiffs con-
tributory negligence to diminish his recovery, and a reckless plaintiff may not
recover at all-the same results that obtained at common law. 6
This Comment will trace the development of recklessness at common law
and will summarize its status in American jurisdictions that have adopted
comparative fault. It will analyze the American cases that have addressed the
issue and will attempt to unravel some of the confusion that has surrounded
the kind-degree distinction. Last, it will suggest means by which courts might
undertake more systematic analyses of the status of recklessness in compara-
tive fault systems. The Comment will not address two of the more complex
issues collaterally related to recklessness: (a) recklessness comparisons
involving multiple parties (e.g., a case wherein a contributorily negligent
plaintiff sues three defendants, two of whom were reckless), and (b) the
comparison of recklessness with types of fault other than negligence (e.g.,
strict liability or intentional torts).
12. The words "if not all" in the text accompanying this note refer to a small number of states, including
Arkansas, Maine, and Oregon, whose comparative fault statutes use the word "fault" rather than "negligence,"
and might, therefore, be said to have intended comparison of recklessness to the extent that that concept is
subsumed by the term "fault." See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 156 (1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1979). New York. whose statute refers to "culpable conduct," is
another state whose legislature at least arguably has addressed the issue. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1141
(McKinney 1976).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 36-151 (for a detailed discussion of all of these cases).
14. See, e.g., Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1%2) (see infra text accompanying notes
36-43).
15. See, e.g., Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763, 602 P.2d 605 (1979) (see infra text accompanying notes 76-93).
16. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 5.3, at 105; § 5.5. at I11.
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II. RECKLESSNESS AT COMMON LAW
The doctrine of contributory negligence, adopted in England in 180917
and first adopted in an American jurisdiction in 1824, 8 received significant
judicial support during the laissez faire era of the Industrial Revolution. The
doctrine's popularity largely was due to the fashion in which it facilitated the
growth of railroads and industry through the limitation of personal injury
claims.' 9 The outstanding feature of the doctrine, as indicated above, was that
the plaintiff's contributory negligence operated as a complete bar to his re-
20
covery, provided that it had in any measure contributed to his injury. Con-
tributory negligence came under increasing attack during the twentieth cen-
tury due to the harsh manner in which it frequently deprived a plaintiff of
recovery from a tortfeasor who was much more negligent than he. Being a
complete defense, contributory negligence did not simply reduce a plaintiff's
damages; it forced him to assume the entire loss, even though the defendant
clearly may have been the greater wrongdoer.
22
As judicial discontent with the harshness of the contributory negligence
bar grew, courts searched for ways to ameliorate its effect. This search led to
the creation of the doctrine of last clear chance23 as well as a brief flirtation in
some American jurisdictions with degrees of negligence.24 It also led to rules
disallowing the use by a defendant of the contributory negligence bar when he
had violated a statute designed to protect a class of which the plaintiff was a
25 26
member. Lastly, it led to the adoption of the doctrine of recklessness.
Under noncomparative systems of negligence, the recklessness doctrine,
by merely shifting the entire burden of the loss from plaintiff to defendant, in
many instances functioned with practically the same degree of inequity as had
17. Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). See H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE
FAULT: THE NEGLIGENCE CASE § 1:3, at 6 (1978).
18. Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824). See H. WOODS, supra note 17, § 1:3, at 7.
19. See generally H. WOODS, supra note 17, §§ 1:3-1:6, for a discussion of this aspect of the growth of
contributory negligence.
20. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 65; Turk, supra note 2, at 199.
21. See Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL L. Q. 333 (1932); Turk, supra
note 2, at 199-203; Whelan, Comparative Negligence, 1938 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467-68; Comment, Comparative
Negligence in Louisiana, 11 TUL. L. REV. 112 (1936). Indeed, Dean Leon Green labeled contributory neg-
ligence "the harshest doctrine known to the common law of the nineteenth century." Green, Illinois Negligence
Law, 39 ILL. L. REV. 36 (1944).
22. Turk, supra note 2, at 199-200 (citing Comment, supra note 21, at 122-23).
23. See supra note 3.
24. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 34; Elliott, Degrees ofNegligence, 6 S. CAL. L. REV. 91,
135 (1933); The Three Degrees of Negligence, 8 AM. L. REV. 649 (1874). The degrees of negligence approach
involved a categorization of negligence into slight, ordinary, and gross negligence. As an integrated system, the
approach functioned as a crude form of comparative negligence and received a fair degree of support in the
bailment context. It rapidly fell from favor, however, when employed in nonbailment negligence cases. See W.
PROSSER, supra note 3, § 34. Vestiges of the system remain, however. While slight negligence is not employed
at present (except in a de facto sense in modem systems of comparative fault), all American jurisdictions employ
ordinary negligence, and a number have retained gross negligence or a variation thereof.
25. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 1.2(A), at 5.
26. See id.; H. WOODS, supra note 17, § 1:6, at 12-13; Turk, supra note 2, at 203-04.
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the contributory negligence bar it was designed to ameliorate.27 The absence
of adequate means of equitably allocating losses within the context of com-
mon-law negligence was a major impetus in the push for the adoption of
comparative fault.21
III. RECKLESSNESS UNDER EVOLVING
SYSTEMS OF COMPARATIVE FAULT: THE DILEMMA
Despite the significant opposition to the contributory negligence doc-
trine, the adoption of comparative fault as a substitute for the doctrine in
American jurisdictions was slow in coming. Prior to 1969 only seven Amer-
ican jurisdictions had adopted comparative fault.29 It was not until 1969 that
the adoption of comparative fault gained momentum.30  Between 1969 and
1981, largely in response to a perceived need to distribute more adequately
the costs of automobile accidents and to a strenuous promotion of no fault
insurance,31 a flood of American jurisdictions adopted systems of compar-
ative fault. At the time of this writing systems of comparative fault exist in at
least thirty-eight American jurisdictions, plus Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands.32  Most of these jurisdictions legislatively adopted the doctrine.33
Seven did so judicially.34
The rapid development of comparative fault has left the future of the
27. See Turk, supra note 2, at 204, where the author observes that the difficulty in distinguishing reckless-
ness from negligence was a major reason that the recklessness doctrine was unsuccessful in mitigating the
severity of the contributory negligence rule.
28. See supra note 21.
29. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 1.1, at 1.
30. Id. § 1.1, at 2.
31. Id. § 1.4, at 15 n. 15; Wade, Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 14 FORUM 379, 380 (1979).
32. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 1.1 (Supp. 1981). See also H. WOODS, supra note 17, § 1.11 (Supp.
1981) (discussing Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Itl. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981), which was decided after the publication of
Professor Schwartz' supplement).
33. The statutes adopting comparative fault for U.S. jurisdictions are: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to
-1765 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973 & Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West
Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 66-402 (1979), 94-703 (1978), 105-603 (1968); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31
(1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801 to -806 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-258a, -258b (1976); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2323 (West Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15
(1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141
(1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 15-5.1 to .3 (West Supp. 198 1);
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (MeKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2315.19 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13-14 (West Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1979);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7102 (Purdon Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-27-37 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (Supp.
1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1978); WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977). See also H. WOODS,
supra note 17, where all of the statutes listed here are printed in full in the appendix.
34. The seven cases adopting comparative fault for U.S. jurisdictions are: Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037
(Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804,532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 I1. 2d 1,421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights,
405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); and Bradley v.
Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979). See also V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 1. 1 (& Supp.
1981); H. WOODS, supra note 17, § 1:11 (& Supp. 1981).
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doctrine of recklessness in a state of considerable uncertainty. None of the
statutes adopting comparative fault in American jurisdictions directly ad-
dresses the question of the future of recklessness. Similarly, the decisions of
the seven state supreme courts that have adopted comparative fault are large-
ly devoid of references to the recklessness question.
This state of uncertainty has left trial courts and intermediate courts of
appeal with something of a dilemma: in negligence cases in which at least one
of the parties has been reckless,3 should that party's recklessness continue to
have an all-or-nothing effect? If so, it would prevent the reckless defendant
from raising the plaintiff's contributory negligence as a defense and would bar
recovery by the reckless plaintiff. Alternatively, should recklessness simply
be considered by the fact finder as another factor in making its allocation of
fault? Indeed, what criteria should even be used in deciding the question?
IV. THE CASES
Roughly a dozen American courts have confronted the question of the
role of recklessness under comparative fault systems and, in a manner per-
haps indicative of the confusion existent in this area of the law, have split on
the outcome.
A. Wisconsin
While most of these decisions are relatively recent, the earliest ones date
back as far as the 1962 decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Bielski v.
Schulze.36 In Bielski, which arose out of an automobile accident, the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court reexamined the viability of the gross negligence doctrine in
the state. Wisconsin courts are not among those that have recognized a dis-
tinction between gross negligence and recklessness.37 Indeed, prior Wiscon-
sin decisions had described grossly negligent parties as acting "rashly,"
"recklessly," and "wantonly., 38 Under state law prior to Bielski, gross neg-
ligence functioned in a manner identical to that in which recklessness func-
tioned in other jurisdictions: it constituted an all-or-nothing bar to re-
covery.39 In Bielski the Wisconsin Supreme Court eliminated gross negli-
gence, saying:
The history of the development of gross negligence, its reason for existing, the
content of the concept, and the inequitable results and consequences of its applica-
tion have led us to decide the doctrine of gross negligence, as we know it, should
be interred in the limbo of jurisprudence along side the doctrine of assumption of
risk in negligence cases.
40
35. The existence of recklessness generally is seen as a question of fact. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence
§ 107 (1971).
36. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
37. Id. at 14-15, 114 N.W.2d at 112.
38. Lockwood v. Belle City St. Ry., 92 Wis. 97, 113, 65 N.W. 866, 871 (1896). See also the other cases with
similar holdings cited in Bielski at 16 Wis. 2d 1, 14-15, 114 N.W.2d 105, 112 (1962).
39. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 16 n.25, 114 N.W.2d 105, 112 n.25 (1962) (citing Astin v. Chicago,
Minn. & St. Paul R.R., 143 Wis. 477, 128 N.W. 265 (1910)).
40. 16 Wis. 2d I. 14. 114 N.W.2d 105. 111-12 (1962).
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The court commenced its analysis with a discussion of the origin of the
gross negligence rule. It stated that under prior Wisconsin law the basis for
precluding recovery by a party guilty of gross negligence had been that the
party's fault differed in kind, rather than in degree, from that of the party
guilty of ordinary negligence.4' The court then proceeded to reject the viabil-
ity of the gross negligence doctrine, saying that "[m]uch of what constituted
gross negligence" was merely "a high percentage of ordinary negligence.
42
In doing so the court stressed "the basic goal of the law of negligence, the
equitable distribution of the loss in relation to the respective contribution of
the faults causing it.'4
3
By equating gross negligence (or "much of what constituted gross neg-
ligence") with "a high percentage of ordinary negligence," the Bielski court
implicitly rejected the idea that gross negligence differs in kind from ordinary
negligence. If the court in fact had viewed gross negligence as differing in
kind, it presumably would not have included gross negligence in its "ordinary
negligence" category. Indeed, the court's "high percentage" characterization
strongly suggests a degree approach.
B. Arkansas
In 1966 a federal court applying Arkansas law reached a similar result.
Billingsley v. Westrac Co.44 arose out of a traffic accident.45 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in an opinion by Circuit Judge
Harry Blackmun,46 held that even if the defendant's conduct had been "will-
ful and wanton" (which was neither alleged nor proved in the trial court),47 it
still would be compared with the decedent's contributory negligence under
the Arkansas comparative fault statute.48 The majority said it felt persuaded
that the Arkansas Supreme Court would similarly apply the statute when
faced with the question.
49
The court sided with the Bielski court on the kind-degree question. In-
deed, without actually saying so, the court based its decision on the kind-
degree distinction. Although recognizing that "it has been said that willful
misconduct is not, properly speaking, within the meaning of the term 'neg-
ligence,' , the court cited a number of Arkansas cases as authority to the
41. Id. at 16, 114 N.W.2d at 112. But see id. at 14-15 n.18, 114 N.W.2d at 112 n. 18 (The court cites six of its
cases, decided between 1853 and 18%, that speak of gross negligence as differing in degree from ordinary
negligence.).
42. Id. at 17, 114 N.W.2d at 113.
43. Id. It is worthy of note that the system of comparative fault existing in Wisconsin at the time of Bielski
was a partial comparative fault system of the Arkansas variety (see infra note 117). In 1971 Wisconsin switched
to the New Hampshire variety of partial comparative fault, allowing recovery to plaintiffs whose fault was found
to equal exactly that of the defendant. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981).
44. 365 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1966).
45. The accident occurred at night. Plaintiff's decedent struck defendant's unlit tractor trailer, which was
blocking both lanes and both shoulders of a highway as its driver attempted a U-turn. Id. at 620-21.
46. Mr. Justice Blackmun now sits on the U.S. Supreme Court.
47. 365 F.2d 6199 622 (8th Cir. 1966).
48. Id. at 623.
49. Id.
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contrary.51 The Arkansas approach, amply demonstrated in the state's guest
statute cases,52 was to equate "willfully and wantonly" and "wilful miscon-
duct" with "willful and wanton negligence" or some other negligence phrase-
ology.53 The court cited the language of the Arkansas Supreme Court in
Harkrider v. CoX54 as typifying the Arkansas approach: "'We do not agree
that willful and wanton disregard or misconduct is an area, or field, of law
entirely distinct and apart from negligence. Our previous opinion several
times mentions "willful and wanton negligence." "Willful and wanton neg-
ligence" and "willful and wanton disregard" are synonymous in mean-
ing .... ,, Lastly, the court expressed its own support for the Arkansas
approach, suggesting it to be the only approach consistent with the policies
underlying comparative negligence: "We note, too, the added factor that the
purpose of a comparative negligence statute is thwarted whenever there is a
judicial characterization of an act as something other than negligence. 5 6
The Arkansas Legislature in 1973 effectively adopted the Billingsley
court's position on this issue. In a revised statute adopted that year the word
"fault" was used in place of the word "negligence," and "fault" was defined
to include "willful and wanton conduct.,
57
C. New Jersey
Most of the other decisions in this area are of much more recent vintage.
In 1976 the Law Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey considered the
question in Draney v. Bachman.'8 The case involved an effort by an injured
automobile passenger to amend her complaint to allege "gross negligence or
wanton and willful conduct" on the part of the defendant driver. 9 The court
elected to "disregard the comparative negligence statute when dealing with
willful and wanton conduct, but to apply it to all 'degrees' of negligence,
dropping any distinction between 'gross' and other negligence." 6 In doing
51. 365 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 1966).
52. Arkansas' guest statutes, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-913, -915 (1979), employ the words "'wilfully and
wantonly operated" and "wilful misconduct."
53. 365 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 1966).
54. 232 Ark. 165, 334 S.W.2d 875 (1960).
55. 365 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 1966) (quoting Harkrider v. Cox, 232 Ark. 165, 169, 334 S.W.2d 875, 877
(1960)).
56. 365 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 1966). Professor Schwartz has correctly labeled this language "a bit con-
clusory," noting that "[s]tate legislatures have left little written history to show the purpose behind comparative
negligence statutes." V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 5.3, at 107.
57. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763, -1764 (1979). The 1973 act specifically defined "fault" to include
"willful and wanton conduct." V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 5.3, at 107. A 1975 amendment omitted the
"'willful and wanton" language, but incorporated a very broad definition of fault including "any act, omission,
[or] conduct ... which is a proximate cause of any damages sustained by any party." ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
27-1763, -1764 (1979). Professor Schwartz is quick to observe that the adoption of the 1973 enactment "does not
necessarily indicate that the 1961 legislature intended the same result when it enacted the statute under which
Billingsley was decided." V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 5.3, at 108.
58. 138 N.J. Super. 503, 351 A.2d 409 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). The Draney decision is discussed in a
comment at 8 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 376 (1977).
59. 138 N.J. Super. 503, 505, 351 A.2d 409, 410 (Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1976).
60. Id. at 508, 351 A.2d at 412.
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so the court frankly acknowledged its differences with the Bielski and Bill-
ingsley courts and relied on prior New Jersey case law holding that willful and
wanton conduct differed in kind, rather than degree, from ordinary negli-
gence.61 The court, in abolishing gross negligence, observed that although
Wisconsin had in name abolished only gross negligence, it had in fact abol-
ished willful misconduct as well.62 The Draney court also cited two recent
New Jersey cases that "apparently elevated to the status of a separate tort,
the claim of willful, wanton and reckless conduct," 63 as well as one com-
mentator who agreed with the court's view on the willful misconduct issue.
64
The court concluded that the legislature apparently was not contemplating the
comparison of willful and wanton conduct when it enacted the state's com-
parative negligence statute and that the willful and wanton conduct doctrine,
therefore, continued to be a viable part of New Jersey law.65
D. Oregon
In Johnson v. Tilden66 the Oregon Supreme Court addressed the question
of the role of recklessness in the context of a guest statute case. The court
concluded, based largely on legislative history, that comparative fault prin-
. 67
ciples would apply to cases based on gross negligence. Gross negligence in
Oregon is equated with "reckless disregard" as that term is defined in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.68
A 1975 amendment to the Oregon comparative negligence statute had
substituted the word "fault" for the word "negligence.- 69 The legislative
history relied upon by the court suggested that the amendment was intended
to broaden the types of fault covered by the statute.70 Although the holding in
61. Id. at 512-13, 351 A.2d at 414 (citing Tabor v. O'Grady, 61 N.J. Super. 446, 161 A.2d 267 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1960)).
62. 138 N.J. Super. 503, 512, 351 A.2d 409, 414 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). But see Davies v. Butler, 95
Nev. 763, 602 P.2d 605 (1979), which erroneously concluded that the Bielski court was dealing with gross
negligence alone. For a discussion of this aspect of the Davies opinion, see infra note 91.
63. 138 N.J. Super. 503,513,351 A.2d 409, 414-15 (Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1976) (citing McLaughlin v. Rova
Farms Inc., 56 N.J. 288, 266 A.2d 284 (1970); Acken v. Campbell, 67 N.J. 585, 342 A.2d 172 (1975)).
64. Bouchard, Apportionment of Damages Under Comparative Negligence, 55 MASS L.Q. 125, 139 (1970).
This commentator's approach to the issue is perplexing. Relying on a 1905 Massachusetts case recognizing the
kind-degree distinction, Bouchard asserts that the Massachusetts comparative negligence statute does not apply
to cases involving "willful, wanton, and reckless conduct." Id. Yet in his conclusion Bouchard states that the
new statute "renders obsolete ... the classification of 'willful, wanton, and reckless' conduct which has long
been condemned as 'unworkable,' 'weasel words' possessing 'chameleon-like characteristics."' Id. at 143
(citing 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1215 n.16 (1956)). If, as Bouchard states, the new
statute does not apply to recklessness, it is difficult to imagine how it has rendered the doctrine obsolete.
65. 138 N.J. Super. 503, 514, 351 A.2d 409, 415 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
66. 278 Or. 11, 562 P.2d 1188 (1977).
67. Id.
68. Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Or. 366, 392,354 P.2d 56,68 (1960) (employing the definition of"reckless
disregard" in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965)).
69. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 18.470-.490 (1979). The Oregon system is a partial comparative fault system akin to
that adopted in New Hampshire (plaintiff still recovers on a 50-50 verdict). See infra note 117. Note the
similarity between this amendment and that adopted in Arkansas following the decision in Billingsley v. Westrac
Co., 365 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1966) (See supra note 57 and accompanying text).
70. 278 Or. 11, 17, 562 P.2d 1188, 1191 (1977).
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Johnson was limited to guest statute actions, dictum in the opinion evinced a
judicial intention to give broad application to the new "fault" provision:
It is our opinion that SB797 was intended from the outset to provide that
comparative fault principles were to apply in actions premised on gross neg-
ligence, and that the revision which substituted the term "fault" for the reference
to "negligence or gross negligence" was designed not to exclude actions based on
gross negligence, but rather to include such actions, as well as any other actions
based on tortious conduct, however described, in which contributory negligence is
an appropriate defense. 7'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, ostensibly
72applying Oregon law in Ryan v. Foster & Marshall, Inc., appears to have
ignored or been unaware of the holding in Johnson.73 In Ryan the court
upheld a trial court determination that gross negligence could not be com-
pared with ordinary negligence under Oregon's system of comparative fault.74
Given the Johnson holding, this aspect of Ryan was wrongly decided. Stating
that the Oregon Supreme Court had not passed on the question, the court
quoted and endorsed the trial court's holding that " '[i]f the Oregon legislature
had intended to include gross negligence in O.R.S. § 18.470, its comparative-
negligence statute, it would have been easy to do so."' 75 This is the extent of
the discussion of the issue by the Ryan court. Neither Johnson nor any other
relevant case is cited. Given the Johnson holding, one would hope that neither
the lower courts in Oregon nor the Ninth Circuit will be misled by the Ryan
decision.
E. Nevada
In 1979 the Nevada Supreme Court addressed the recklessness issue in
76Davies v. Butler. The court reached a conclusion opposite to that reached
by the Bielski,77 Billingsley,78 and Johnson79 courts and held, based largely on
an analysis of the relevant legislation,80 that willful or wanton misconduct
would remain an all-or-nothing doctrine in Nevada. 8' The case involved
the death of a young man by alcohol poisoning during his initiation into a
71. Id. The revision referred to in the quote is to the senate bill, not to the statute. The original bill would
have altered the language of the statute to provide that ordinary negligence would be compared with "negligence
or gross negligence." Id. at 16-17, 562 P.2d at 1191.
72. 556 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1977).
73. Given the dates the cases were decided, it would appear that the Ryan court simply was ignorant of the
Johnson holding at the time it drafted its opinion. Johnson was decided April 19, 1977; Ryan was decided on
June 28, 1977.
74. 556 F.2d 460, 465 (9th Cir. 1977).
75. Id. The trial court's opinion was not officially reported.
76. 95 Nev. 763, 602 P.2d 605 (1979).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 44-55.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
80. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1979).
81. 95 Nev. 763, 769, 602 P.2d 605, 609 (1979).
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social drinking club.82 The trial court in the case had instructed the jury that
Nevada's comparative fault system could not be used to diminish plaintiff's
recovery if the defendants' conduct was "intended to inflict harm." 3 The
Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding that the instruction should have
been that Nevada's comparative fault system could not be used if defendants'
conduct was "willful or wanton.' 8
In determining that willful or wanton misconduct on the part of defend-
ants would preclude their invocation of the decedent's contributory negli-
gence to lessen or bar plaintiff's recovery, the court relied on the wording of
the Nevada comparative negligence statute.85 The court noted that the statute
specifically listed "negligence" and "gross negligence" as conduct capable of
being compared, but was conspicuously devoid of reference to willful or
wanton misconduct. 86 The court then observed that it repeatedly had drawn a
87distinction between gross negligence and willful or wanton misconduct and
therefore concluded that "[iln light of these decisions, it is clear that the
legislature, by the use of the term 'gross negligence,' could not have contem-
plated that the term would include the distinct concepts of willful or wanton
misconduct."88
Had the court restricted its analysis to the statutory language, its opinion
would have been logically and legally unassailable. Unfortunately, it did not.
It indicated its support for the kind approach to the kind-degree ques-
tion, 9 yet misrepresented the position of the California Supreme Court on the
82. According to testimony in the case, the decedent, John Davies, after drinking constantly for some 3
days as a part of his initiation, participated in a "final ceremony" in which he and others were lined up against a
wall, verbally and physically hazed, and forced to drink large quantities of 190 proof "Everclear" alcohol within
a 30 to 40 minute period. He was then placed in the back of a pickup truck with his fellow initiates and driven
some 40 to 50 miles from Reno into the desert, where it was discovered that he had stopped breathing. Club
members administered artificial resuscitation without success. While speeding back to Reno, the driver ran out
of gas. An ambulance was called, and Davies was pronounced dead at the nearest hospital. Id. at 765-66, 602
P.2d at 607.
83. Id. at 769, 602 P.2d at 609.
84. Id.
85. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1979).
86. 95 Nev. 763, 770-71, 602 P.2d 605, 610 (1979).
87. Id. The court cited language from three Nevada cases defining wanton misconduct and ostensibly
differentiating it from ordinary or gross negligence. Quoting from Hart v. Kline, 61 Nev. 96, 116 P.2d 672 (1941),
the court said:
Gross negligence is manifestly a smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection than the circum-
stances require of a prudent man. But it falls short of being such reckless disregard of probable
consequences as is equivalent to a wilful and intentional wrong. Ordinary and gross negligence differ in
degree of inattention, 'hile both differ in kind from wilful and intentional conduct which is or ought to
be known to hare a tendency to injury.
95 Nev. 763,770-71,602 P.2d 605,610 (1979) (emphasis added by the Davies court). Although the court refers to
.. reckless disregard of probable consequences," the conduct differentiated from gross negligence is willful and
intentional conduct, rather than willful and wanton misconduct, willful misconduct, or recklessness.
88. 95 Nev. 763, 771, 602 P.2d 605, 610 (1979).
89. See supra note 87 for the emphasized portion of the language from Hart v. Kline. 61 Nev. 96, 116 P.2d
672 (1941). that the Davies court used to support its kind stance.
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issue,90 incorrectly distinguished Bielski" and Billingsley,92 and presented
Professor Schwartz' position on the issue in a somewhat misleading manner.93
In the process, the court seriously undermined the quality of its opinion and
further muddied the waters on the issue of recklessness for others seeking
guidance from the opinion.
90. The Davies court incorrectly attributed to the decision of the California Supreme Court in Li v. Yellow
Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), the dictum that "henceforth both gross
negligence and willful or wanton misconduct would be subject to comparative negligence." Davies, 95 Nev. 763,
771-72, 602 P.2d 605, 610 (1979). The California court said no such thing, choosing, instead, to defer considera-
tion of the question:
Two of the indicated areas (i.e., multiple parties and willful misconduct) are not involved in the case
before us, and we consider it neither necessary nor wise to address ourselves to specific problems of
this nature which might be expected to arise. As the Florida court stated with respect to the same
subject, "it is not the proper function of this Court to decide unripe issues, without the benefit of
adequate briefing, not involving an actual controversy, and unrelated to a specific factual situation."
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 826, 532 P.2d 1226, 1241-42, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 873-74 (1975) (quoting
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431,439 (Fla. 1973)). The actual dictum to which the court referred, while perhaps
indicative of a bias in the direction suggested by the Davies court, was largely equivocal:
The thought is that the difference between willful and wanton misconduct and ordinary negligence is
one of kind rather than degree in that the former involves conduct of an entirely different order
[footnote omitted], and under this conception it might well be urged that comparative negligence
concepts should have no application when one of the parties has been guilty of willful and wanton
misconduct. It has been persuasively argued, however, that the loss of deterrent effect that would
occur upon application of comparative fault concepts to willful and wanton misconduct as well as
ordinary negligence would be slight, and that a comprehensive system of comparative negligence
should allow for the apportionment of damages in all cases involving misconduct which falls short of
being intentional.
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 825-26, 532 P.2d 1226, 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 873 (1975) (citing V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 5.3). The Davies court distinguished the Li opinion on the grounds that the
California Supreme Court, in judicially adopting comparative fault, was not faced with the problem of determin-
ing legislative intent. Davies, 95 Nev. 763, 772, 602 P.2d 605, 610 (1979). For the reasons set forth above, the
court had no need to distinguish Li because the California Supreme Court did not reach the question.
91. Pointing out that both Billingsley and Bielski had dealt with gross negligence, the Davies court conclud-
ed that "[t]he conclusion we reach today is consistent with the approach taken by these courts." Davies, 95
Nev. 763,772,602 P.2d 605, 611 (1979). This assertion is incorrect. The court ignored Wisconsin's application of
the label "gross negligence" to the same conduct that in otherjurisdictions is called "willful misconduct" (see
supra notes 38-39). As a result, the court failed to appreciate the applicability of Bielski to the area of willful and
wanton misconduct.
92. The Davies court said that the Billingsley court had concluded that willful and wanton negligence amount-
ed to gross negligence in Arkansas and therefore should be subject to comparison under the statute. 95 Nev. 763,
772, 602 P.2d 605, 610 (1979). The court's reading of BUllingsley is strained at best. Nowhere did the Billingsley
court equate willful and wanton negligence with gross negligence (although there appears to be no reason that
the court would have been adverse to such an equation). Rather, the court pointed to Arkansas opinions that
equated willful misconduct and willful and wanton disregard with willful and wanton negligence. 365 F.2d 619,
623 (8th Cir. 1966). The point in Billingsley, apparently lost on the Davies court, was that willful misconduct (or
willful and wanton disregard) is a type of negligence, not that there is no difference between willful or wanton
negligence and gross negligence.
93. The Davies court substantiated its conclusion with the authority of Professor Schwartz' text:
As noted by V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 5.3 (1974), to the extent that the concepts of
willful and wanton misconduct or gross negligence were instituted merely to ameliorate the hardships
of the contributory negligence rule, the rationale no longer applies under comparative negligence, but
to the extent that they reflect a judgment that the defendant's culpability "is so close to intentional
wrongdoing that he should not have the benefit of contributory negligence," the basis for the rule is
unchanged by a comparative negligence system.
95 Nev. 763, 772, 602 P.2d 605, 611 (1979). The argument happens to be a very cogent one, but is not completely
representative of Professor Schwartz' position. Schwartz merely asserts that if the circumstances are such as
appear in this passage from Davies, "the courts are presented with a very difficult issue if the legislature has
given no guidance." V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 5.3, at 105. Schwartz' view on how that issue should come
out, expressed elsewhere in § 5.3, runs contrary to the view of the Davies court:
It is this author's view that the likelihood is slight that wanton or reckless conduct would be effectively
deterred by complete loss of the contributory negligence defense. For this reason and because the core
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F. Wyoming
The Supreme Court of Wyoming addressed the recklessness issue in
Danculovich v. Brown,94 a case brought under Wyoming's guest statute be-
fore that statute was declared invalid.95 The trial court had removed the
willful and wanton misconduct issue from the jury, which subsequently re-
turned a verdict finding gross negligence on the part of the defendant and
apportioned the negligence fifty-three percent to defendant and forty-seven
percent to the decedent9 (Wyoming, unlike Wisconsin, draws a distinction
between gross negligence and willful and wanton misconduct).97
It is significant that, as Justice Rose observed in his special concurrence,
the issue of the role of willful misconduct under Wyoming's comparative fault
system was not discussed in the trial court in Danculovich, nor was it briefed
on appeal. 98 Rather, the supreme court appears to have raised the issue sua
sponte. Justice Rose, criticizing this action by the majority, called the ques-
tion "a 'straw-man' issue, set up so that the majority can knock it down and
thereby establish binding principles for the future. ' 9
9
The court held that willful misconduct could not be compared with or-
dinary negligence under Wyoming's comparative negligence system because
willful misconduct differs in kind, rather than degree, from ordinary neg-
ligence.'00 The court's sources for that assertion were Dean Prosser,0 ' a
comment in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,'°2 and Corpus Juris Secun-
dum. O3 The court's analysis of the issue is less than lucid. It suggests that the
two types of fault differ in kind because willful misconduct approaches inten-
tional conduct.'04 The court's language, however, appears to equate willful
misconduct with intentional conduct:
Willful and wanton misconduct, in the strict sense, is not negligence, since it
involves intent rather than inadvertence.
... Willful misconduct is the intentional doing of something which should
not be done, or intentional failure to do something which should be
done.... It is sillfully designed to accomplish a specific result, and is not aimless
of purpose or regardless of results." 05
of comparative negligence is full apportionment on the basis of fault, courts should adopt the Wiscon-
sin approach and should apportion damages when the plaintiff has been negligent and defendant's
conduct falls short of being intentional even though defendant's conduct has been grossly negligent,
reckless, or "willful negligent misconduct."
V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 5.3, at 108.
94. 593 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1979).
95. WYO. STAT. § 31-5-1116 (1977), declared in Nehring v. Russel, 582 P.2d 67 (Wyo. 1978), to violate the
guarantee of uniform operation of laws established by the Wyoming Constitution.
96. 593 P.2d 187, 190 (Wyo. 1979).
97. Mitchell v. Walters, 55 Wyo. 317, 100 P.2d 102 (1940).
98. 593 P.2d 187, 197-98 (Wyo. 1979) (Rose, J., specially concurring).
99. Id. at 198.
100. Id. at 193.
101. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 34, at 185.
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 comment g (1965).
103. 65 C.J.S. Negligence §§ 9(l)(b)-9(l)(c) (1966).
104. 593 P.2d 187, 193 (Wyo. 1979).
105. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Walters, 55 Wyo. 317, 331, 100 P.2d 102, 106-07 (1940)) (emphasis added).
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The court clarified this confusing language by saying that the intent in a
case of willful and wanton misconduct is an intent to do or to fail to do an act
(in reckless disregard of the consequences), not an intent to produce the
consequences.' 6 Nonetheless, the opinion would have been improved by the
deletion, at least, of the language suggesting that willful misconduct is "will-
fully designed to accomplish a specific result."
G. Oklahoma
The reasoning in Billingsley17 was adopted in 1980 by the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma in Amoco Pipeline Co. v.
Montgomery.'08 The court noted that the Oklahoma comparative negligence
statute' °9 was adopted from and was very similar to the Arkansas statute and
that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had stated that it would be reasonable to
look to Arkansas law for assistance in properly construing the statute."10
Based on this direction from the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the Amoco
court looked to the interpretation of the Arkansas statute by the Billingsley
court and elected to adopt it."' The court distinguished Davies'2 based on
the presence of the words "gross negligence" in the Nevada statute inter-
preted in Davies."' The court indicated, however, that its decision fundamen-
tally was at odds with the Davies opinion, as well as with the Wyoming
Supreme Court's opinion in Danculovich,14 due to differences on the kind-
degree question and the proper role of recklessness within a system of com-
parative fault. The Amoco court sided with the Billingsley court on the kind-
degree issue, saying that the rationale for the recklessness doctrine-the
106. 593 P.2d 187, 193 (Wyo. 1979). The court's language, taken from Mitchell v. Walters, 55 Wyo. 317, 100
P.2d 102 (1940), was:
The intent in willful and wanton misconduct is not an intent to cause the injury, but it is an intent
to do an act, or an intent to not do an act, in reckless disregard of the consequences, and under such
circumstances and conditions that a reasonable man would know, or have reason to know, that such
conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in substantial harm to another.
Danculovich, 593 P.2d 187, 193 (Wyo. 1979). Compare this language with the definition of "intent" in § 8A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 8A sets forth an alternative to its "desire" definition of intent,
saying that an actor "intends" the consequences ofhis act not only if he "desires" them but also if he "believes
that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A
(1965). Comment b to § 8A discusses this alternative definition, saying, "If the actor knows that the conse-
quences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law
as if he had in fact desired to produce the result." Id. comment b. Although comment b goes on to describe
recklessness as differing from this kind of intent in terms of the probability that the consequences will follow, it
is clear that the line between the two is not well defined. The possible use of § 8A intent analysis as an
alternative to recklessness for courts confronting the recklessness issue is discussed later in this Comment. See
infra text accompanying notes 174-76.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 44-57.
108. 487 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
109. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13-14 (West Supp. 1981).
110. 487 F. Supp. 1268, 1272 (W.D. Okla. 1980). See Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978).
111. 487 F. Supp. 1268, 1272 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 76-93.
113. 487 F. Supt. 1268, 1270-71 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 94-106.
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amelioration of the hardships imposed by the harsh contributory negligence
rule-had disappeared with the adoption of comparative negligence." 5
H. Florida
In 1980 the case of Bernard v. Florida East Coast Railway'16 nearly
presented the Florida Supreme Court with an opportunity to address the
question of the role of recklessness under the pure system of comparative
fault 17 it had adopted in Hoffman v. Jones.' In Bernard the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified the question of the role of recklessness
to the Florida Supreme Court." The Florida Supreme Court never got an
opportunity to address the question, however, because the case was settled
before it was argued.20
I. California
The question of the role of recklessness in a system of pure comparative
fault has been litigated more extensively in California than in other states. In
1975 the California Supreme Court judicially adopted a system of pure com-
parative fault in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 121 In doing so the court specifically
declined to decide the question of the role of recklessness (called "willful
1 15. 487 F. Supp. 1268, 1272 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (citing V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 5.3). It is interesting
to note that the Amoco court misinterpreted the language of the California Supreme Court in Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), just as the Nevada Supreme Court had in Davies v.
Butler, 95 Nev. 763, 602 P.2d 605 (1979) (see supra note 90). The Amoco court concluded that the Li court had
decided the question of the future of willful misconduct in California. The Amoco court wrote, "The Supreme
Court of California has likewise held that all conduct which falls short of being intentional is subject to
comparative negligence." 487 F. Supp. 1268, 1271 (W.D. Okla. 1980). One would hope that this misperception
of the existing law did not so alter the court's perception of the issue that it affected the outcome of the case.
116. 624 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1980).
117. American jurisdictions have adopted four major forms of comparative fault: pure comparative fault,
two forms of partial comparative fault, and the slight-gross form of comparative fault. Pure comparative fault,
first adopted by Mississippi in 1910, permits the comparison of fault and a plaintiff's recovery regardless of the
percentage of contributory fault attributable to the plaintiff. See H. WOODS, supra note 17,
§ 4:1-4:2. In 1931 Wisconsin statutorily adopted a modified, partial form of comparative fault under which
plaintiff's recovery was barred unless his degree of fault was less than that of the defendant. Id. §§ 4:1, 4:3.
Under this approach, if plaintiff and defendant are found equally at fault, plaintiff's recovery is precluded.
Arkansas, after a brief experiment with pure comparative fault, switched to this system in 1957. Id. This
approach has been called the "Wisconsin-Arkansas Plan." Because Wisconsin subsequently changed its system
to the more liberal one described immediately below, this first partial form is designated the Arkansas approach
in this Comment. In 1969, reacting to a perceived unfairness of disallowing plaintiff's recovery when the parties
are equally at fault, New Hampshire adopted a partial comparative fault statute permitting an equally negligent
plaintiff to recover. Id. H 4:1, 4:4 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7a (Supp. 1979)). Woods notes that there
appears to be a trend toward the adoption of this New Hampshire type of comparative fault statute. H. WOODS,
supra note 17, 88 4:1, 4:4. A fourth type of system, variations of which exist in Nebraska, South Dakota, and
Tennessee, provides for recovery by plaintiff when his negligence is slight and that of the defendant is gross. Id.
88 4:1, 4:5.
118. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
119. 624 F.2d 552, 556 (5th Cir. 1980).
120. Telephone interview with Marjorie D. Gadarian of Jones and Foster, West Palm Beach, Florida,
attorneys for defendant-appellant cross appellee (Jan. 26, 1982).
121. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
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misconduct" or "willful and wanton misconduct" by the California courts).I'
The omission of a specific holding notwithstanding, the court, in dictum, did
give an indication that it was leaning in the direction of comparing willful and
wanton misconduct with ordinary negligence. Recognizing but discounting
the significance of the kind-degree distinction, the court said:
The thought is that the difference between willful and wanton misconduct and
ordinary negligence is one of kind rather than degree in that the former involves
conduct of an entirely different order, [footnote omitted] and under this concep-
tion it might well be urged that comparative negligence concepts should have no
application when one of the parties has been guilty of willful and wanton mis-
conduct. It has been persuasively argued, however, that the loss of deterrent
effect that would occur upon application of comparative fault concepts to willful
and wanton misconduct as well as ordinary negligence would be slight, and that a
comprehensive system of comparative neglegence should allow for the appor-
tionment of damages in all cases involving misconduct which falls short of being
intentional. 123
In Kindt v. Kauffman, 24 a dramshop case,'2s the California Court of
Appeal (Third District) concluded that recklessness should not be compared
with ordinary negligence under California's comparative fault system. 2
6
Kindt was a tavern customer who sued the tavern's owner under California's
dramshop law'27 for injuries he sustained in an automobile accident after
leaving the tavern.128 The appeals court, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the case on defendant's demurrer.'29 The rationale for the
court's decision is somewhat difficult to grasp. The court commenced its
discussion by stating, and apparently misrepresenting, the position of the
California Supreme Court expressed in Li. The court deleted from its opinion
the crucial Li language suggesting the direction in which the supreme court
was leaning on the willful misconduct issue, leaving only language that created
the impression that the supreme court was leaning in the opposite direction.
30
122. The court's language was: -'I]t is not the proper function of this Court to decide unripe issues,
without the benefit of adequate briefing, not involving an actual controversy, and unrelated to a specific factual
situation." Id. at 826, 532 P.2d at 1241-42, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873-74.
123. Id. at 825-26, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
124. 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (Ct. App. 1976).
125. A dramshop case is an action by an injured third party, and in some cases (as in Kindt) an injured
patron, against a liquor seller for selling liquor to a patron who subsequently caused injury. See generally 45 AM.
JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors §§ 562-614 (1969), for a discussion of dramshop actions.
126. 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 847, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 604 (Ct. App. 1976).
127. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1981).
128. 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 847, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 604 (Ct. App. 1976).
129. Id.
130. The Kindt court, in summarizing the view expressed in the Li opinion, deleted the second half of the
quote reproduced in the text above regarding willful misconduct, informing the reader only that the supreme
court had alluded to the kind-degree distinction and had stated, "[lit might well be urged that comparative
negligence concepts should have no application when one of the parties has been guilty of willful and wanton
misconduct .... " 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 852, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1976) (emphasis and ellipsis added
by the Kindt court).
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The discussion in Kindt of the willful misconduct issue is buried in its
analysis of the tavern owner's duty of care to his customer. Indeed, a close
reading of the case suggests that the court's determination regarding willful
misconduct was dictated by its conclusion that a tavern owner owes no duty
to his intoxicated customer. 3 ' The court, in discussing the duty of care owed
a customer by the tavern owner, cited Raymond v. Paradise Unified School
District132 and Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. 3  for the factors to be
considered in a duty determination. It then proceeded, using those factors-
administrative, moral, and socioeconomic considerations-to determine that
no duty exists.
The court then moved to its discussion of willful misconduct. The court's
summary of its conclusions, however, reveals that its determinations regard-
ing willful misconduct were based on exactly the same considerations as its
conclusions regarding duty:
The moral and socio-economic factors however lead us to the conclusion that the
requisite duty of the tavern owner to the drunken patron does not exist, that the
comparative negligence doctrine of Li does not apply to willful misconduct, and
that the Vesely v. Sager rule does not extend to injuries to the drunken patron
himself. 134
Focusing on "moral and socio-economic factors," the court drew an analogy
to illegal drag racing and concluded that the same reasons that would compel
denial of recovery to a reckless party in that context were applicable to the
case at bar.35 The court asserted that to hold comparative negligence ap-
plicable to willful misconduct would amount to "governmental paternalism"
that would award a "pure and simple financial windfall to an undeserving
plaintiff," which would be "in [the court's] view morally indefensible.'
136
The holding of the Kindt court was followed in two subsequent California
dramshop cases at the appellate level, Trenier v. California Investment and
137 138Development Corp. and Sissle v. Stefenoni. It was criticized (and argu-
131. 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 855, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 610 (Ct. App. 1976).
132. 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847 (Ct. App. 1963).
133. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
134. 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 855, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603,610 (Ct. App. 1976) (emphasis added). In Vesely v. Sager,
5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (197 1), cited here by the Kindt court, the California Supreme Court
partially abrogated the common-law rule that prohibited suits by patrons or injured third parties against liquor
sellers for injuries caused by patrons who had been served too much liquor. The Vesely rule, which extended
only to injuries to third parties, was legislatively overruled, along with other decisions that had extended the
rule's coverage, by the California legislature in a 1978 amendment to the California Business and Professions
Code that specifically mentioned Vesely and two other decisions. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 25602-25602.1
(West Supp. 1981) (The 1978 amendments were upheld against constitutional attack by the California Supreme
Court in a 1981 opinion sharply critical of the form and substance of the amendments. Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal.
3d 430, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981).).
135. 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 856, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 610 (Ct. App. 1976).
136. Id. at 856-57, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11.
137. 105 Cal. App. 3d 44, 164 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Ct. App. 1980).
138. 88 Cal. App. 3d 633, 152 Cal. Rptr. 56 (Ct. App. 1979).
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ably overruled),'139 however, by the California Supreme Court in Ewing v.
140 141Cloverleaf Bowl, 0 another dramshop case.
A different group of California courts of appeal, along with the Ninth
Circuit, have taken a different view of the question in a series of more recent
cases. These courts have held that willful misconduct is comparable with
ordinary negligence under California's system of comparative fault .
In Sorensen v. Allred'43 the Fifth District Court of Appeal rejected the
analysis of recklessness as fault differing in kind from ordinary negligence and
held recklessness (willful and wanton misconduct) comparable with ordinary
negligence.' 44 The Second District Court of Appeal adopted the Sorensen
approach in Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. State,45 a case involving
contribution between joint tortfeasors. The Southern Pacific court held that
the need for the recklessness doctrine had disappeared with the adoption of
comparative fault and that "[t]he concept of willful misconduct remains
viable only for an intentional injury which justifies punitive damages."' 46
While the court's choice of words here is poor (suggesting that intentional
conduct might properly be labeled reckless instead of intentional), its decision
to eliminate recklessness does appear clear.
In Plyler v. Wheaton Van Lines 47 the Ninth Circuit was confronted with
a diversity case in which at least one of the parties in a traffic accident had
been guilty of willful misconduct. The court, applying California law, elected
to follow Sorensen, saying that Sorensen merely stated formally "what was
the logical and predictable result of the adoption of comparative fault."' 43 In
Zavala v. Regents of the University of California,149 a case involving self-
inflicted injury to an intoxicated partygoer, the Second District Court of
Appeal rejected the viability of the recklessness doctrine. Citing Sorensen,
139. The Kindt court's determination on the willful and wanton misconduct issue was based on exactly the
same considerations as its determinations regarding duty. See supra text accompanying notes 130-34. In
footnote 8 in its opinion in Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978), the
California Supreme Court expressly rejected the Kindt finding that bartenders owe no duty of care to their
patrons. Inasmuch as both the duty and recklessness determinations of the Kindt court were based on exactly
the same factors, the Ewing case seriously undermines and may overrule Kindt. Indeed, Professor Schwartz, for
an unspecified reason, believes that Kindt was overruled by Ewing. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 5.5, at
49 n.71 (Supp. 1981).
140. 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978).
141. The dramshop cause of action was legislatively eliminated (for nonminors) in California in 1978, effec-
tive January 1, 1979, See supra note 134.
142. Compare supra note 1. California's system may truly be said to be a comparative fault, as opposed to a
comparative negligence, system. The decigion of the California Supreme Court in Daly v. General Motors
Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978), to allow strict products liability to be compared
by a fact finder with ordinary negligence means, ipso facto, that the California scheme is not one that compares
negligence exclusively.
143. 112 Cal. App. 3d 717, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441 (Ct. App. 1980).
144. Id. at 725-26, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
145. 115 Cal. App. 3d 116, 171 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1981).
146. Id. at 121, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91.
147. 640 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1981).
148. Id. at 1093.
149. 125 Cal. App. 3d 646, 178 Cal. Rptr. 185 (Ct. App. 1981).
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Southern Pacific, and Plyler, the court allowed recovery, stating that with the
abolition of contributory negligence the recklessness classification served no
purpose. 15°
The California Supreme Court has yet to decide the question of the role
of recklessness in its system of comparative fault. Given its language in Li,
however, along with the holdings of the Sorensen, Southern Pacific, Plyler,
and Zavala courts, it appears probable that the court will either overrule
Kindt and its progeny or carve out some narrow area of reckless conduct in
which the Kindt holding would apply.15'
V. THE UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT: ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE
152The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, proposed for adoption by the
National Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, deals
with the recklessness question in a manner roughly consistent with the ap-
proach of the degree courts. The proposed Act (yet to be adopted by any U.S.
150. Id. at 650-51, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
151. Given the rather strong language used by the court in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725,
575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978), in favor of apportioning liability based exclusively on degrees of fault,
its favorable citation of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act to the same effect (see infra text accompanying
notes 156-58), and the support the court has expressed for the dramshop cause of action (see supra note 134), it is
much less than certain that the court will uphold the Kindt finding when it is finally confronted with the
question. Of course, given the California legislature's 1978 abrogation of the Kindt cause of action, see supra
note 134, the question is largely moot. In a California law supplement to his text on comparative negligence, V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, Professor Schwartz wrote, "It seems probable that the California [Supreme] Court
will handle the matter of the reckless or willful and wanton defendant the same way it specifically said it would
handle last clear chance: let the jury consider the facts and apportion damages." Id. at 5. (Note, however, that
Professor Schwartz' comment does not reach the reckless plaintiff in Kindt.) If the California Supreme Court
elects, notwithstanding the foregoing, to give Kindt some continuing viability, two vehicles it might employ to
achieve this result, discussed later in this Comment, would be to:
(1) Declare both of the parties in a dramshop action to be reckless (as did the Kindt court) and, using the in
par delicto potior est conditio defendentis maxim of the common law, leave the parties as it finds them and deny
recovery. This possibility is alluded to by Professor Fleming in a legislative study entitled Report to the Joint
Committee of the California Legislature on the Problems Associated With American Motorcycle Association v.
Superior Court, 30 HASTINGS .J. 1464, 1479 (1979). Fleming, while recommending the comparison of ordinary
negligence with recklessness, labeled this issue as one of policy that "might well be left to the courts to work out
on an ad hoc basis." Id. Given the strength with which the California Supreme Court in Ewing v. Cloverleaf
Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978), said that the determinations of recklessness in
cases involving intoxication are questions of fact, it appears less than certain that the court will choose this
option. Indeed, in footnote 10 in its discussion in Ewing, the court expressly overruled the Kindt finding that
consuming alcohol to the point of intoxication constitutes willful misconduct as a matter of law. But see Taylor
v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890,598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979), in which a four-member majority held
that one who voluntarily becomes intoxicated knowing from the outset that he must thereafter operate a'motor
vehicle may be held to be guilty of willful or wanton misconduct. Id. at 899, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
Taylor may likely be held controlling in the Kindt context: it involved drinking and driving; Ewing involved
intoxication alone.
(2) Declare the customer's conduct in drinking to excess and in then attempting to drive to be intentional
conduct consistent with the definition of intent in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). See infra
text accompanying notes 174-75. The conduct, being intentional, would be beyond the scope of even Cali-
fornia's comparative fault scheme. Again, given the language of Ewing and Taylor, it is unclear whether the
California Supreme Court will be willing to assume the fact finder's role in this context in order to make this
determination as a matter of law.
152. 12 U.L.A. 33 (1982).
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jurisdiction) embodies a pure system of comparative fault 53 under which the
claimant's recovery is diminished by the proportion of fault attributable to
him. 54
The Act contains a very broad definition of fault, including not only acts
or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless, but also, inter alia,
strict liability, breach of warranty, and unreasonable assumption of risk.'
55
Thus, the Act eliminates a host of all-or-nothing rules and provides for com-
parisons of reckless conduct not only with ordinary negligence and other
reckless conduct but with a variety of other types of fault as well.
While the proposed Act has yet to be legislatively adopted in any state, it
has been favorably cited in a number of court decisions. Of particular sig-
nificance is the citation of the proposed Act by the California Supreme Court
in Daly v. General Motors Corp."6 In Daly the California court held strict
products liability comparable with ordinary negligence under California's
'57comparative fault scheme. After quoting section 1 of the Act, which con-tains the portions cited above, the court continued:
While lacking any legislative sanction the Act, in our view, points in the
direction of a responsible national trend. As such, section 1 is revealing in two
notable respects: in its clear definitional expression in subsection (b) that com-
parative principles are to be applied to cases of "strict tort liability," and in its
substitution of the broad generic term "fault," in subsection (a), as including both
negligence and strict liability. 
5 8
While the Daly court dealt only with strict liability, it is significant that the
sections of the Act the court quoted are equally applicable to recklessness as
well.
153. See supra note 117 for a discussion of pure comparative fault.
154. Section l(a) of the proposed Act provides:
In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to person or harm to
property, any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount
awarded as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but
does not bar recovery. This rule applies whether or not under prior law the claimant's contributory
fault constituted a defense or was disregarded under applicable legal doctrines, such as last clear
chance.
UNIF. COMP. FAULT ACT § l(a), 12 U.L.A. 34 (1982).
155. Section l(b) contains the proposed Act's definition of fault:
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person
or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability. The term also includes
breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express consent,
misuse of a product for which the defendant otherwise would be liable, and unreasonable failure to
avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the
basis for liability and to contributory fault.
Id. § l(b).
156. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
157. Id. at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
158. Id. at 741-42, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
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VI. DISCUSSION
A. Problems With Present Approaches
The review presented above of the cases that have dealt with the role of
recklessness demonstrates the significant confusion and disagreement that
exist regarding the appropriate function for the doctrine in developing sys-
tems of comparative fault. While some cases in this area have turned on
matters of statutory construction, 9 in large measure the courts have been
guided in their ultimate decisions by their differing conceptions regarding the
nature of recklessness-that is, whether it is fault of an entirely different kind
from ordinary negligence, or whether it is negligence that is simply of a more
exaggerated degree. Indeed, for most of the courts considering this question,
the kind-degree distinction was a crucial, if not dispositive, factor.
The troublesome aspect of most of the cases that have considered the
matter is the courts' tendency to treat the question in largely conclusory
fashion, relying on or rejecting out of hand prior case law holding that the two
types of fault differ in kind (or, in the case of the Billingsley v. Westrac Co.160
court, degree). The temptation to engage in such a conclusory analysis is
significant. No set guidelines exist for courts to consider in determining the
future of a liability-limiting negligence doctrine. The kind-degree distinction
perhaps is also appealing because whichever course a court chooses, its deci-
sion is difficult to assail; ultimately, there is no demonstrably correct alterna-
tive, and the distinction is largely rhetorical.
B. An Alternative Model For Analysis
What, then, is the alternative to a conclusory reliance on the kind-
degree distinction in assessing the proper role of recklessness under a sys-
tem of comparative fault? The ultimate answer lies in an examination of the
policies underlying the recklessness doctrine as well as those underlying the
adoption of comparative fault. Before reaching this stage of the analysis,
however, two threshold considerations that may affect the result should be
examined.
1. Threshold Considerations
A court confronting the recklessness issue first should undertake a thor-
ough review of the legislation, legislative history, or judicial pronouncement
adopting comparative fault for the jurisdiction. If any of these sources sug-
159. See Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763, 602 P.2d 605 (1979) (see supra text accompanying notes 76-93);
Johnson v. Tilden, 278 Or. 11, 562 P.2d 1188 (1977) (see supra text accompanying notes 66-71).
160. 365 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1966) (see supra text accompanying notes 44-57).
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gests an obvious result, it should be considered dispositive. Other less definite
indications of intent contained in these materials should be viewed as persua-
sive authority.
Second, the identity of the party who allegedly is reckless should be
considered. There are three possible combinations of reckless parties, given
our exclusion of multiple-party litigation from the scope of this Comment:
defendant reckless, plaintiff negligent; plaintiff reckless, defendant negligent;
and both parties reckless. Two of these three combinations, the two involving
reckless plaintiffs, pose special problems that should be considered at the
outset of a court's examination of the recklessness issue.
In the case of a reckless plaintiff and a negligent defendant, comparison
of fault by a fact finder is much less appropriate in a partial, as opposed to a
pure, comparative fault jurisdiction.161 If we assume that a reckless party's
share of the blame in a two-party action always will exceed that of the non-
reckless party, the issue of division of damages might be removed from the
fact finder in a partial comparative fault jurisdiction upon a finding that the
plaintiff was reckless. In a pure comparative fault jurisdiction the identity of
the reckless party should not be a factor in deciding the future of recklessness.
When both parties are found to have been reckless, the court is presented
with a different problem altogether. In such a case the court should examine
the extent to which it has in the past employed doctrines such as ex turpi
causa non oritur actio62 and in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis'63
to deny recovery and leave mutually guilty parties as the court finds them.1
64
The court then should balance the policies underlying this treatment of mutu-
ally guilty parties against the extent to which the jurisdiction's comparative
fault system exists to assess liability according to fault, however egregious
that fault might be.
2. Examination of Underlying Policy-The Heart of an Effective Analysis
Absent a disposition based on the threshold factors set out above, a court
confronting the recklessness issue should move next to a consideration of the
policies underlying both the existence of the recklessness doctrine and the
adoption of comparative fault in the jurisdication. It will be shown here that
the court's ultimate determination regarding the role of recklessness should
rest upon a balancing of two possibly competing factors: (a) The extent to
which the jurisdiction's recklessness doctrine reflects a judgment that reck-
161. See generally V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, §§ 3.2, 3.5, for a discussion of pure and partial compara-
tive fault systems. See also supra note 117.
162. "Out of an illegal consideration, an action can not arise." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 529 (rev. 5th
ed. 1979).
163. "In a case of mutual fault, the condition of the defendant is the better one," or "where the fault is
mutual, the law will leave the case as it finds it." Id. at 711.
164. See Appleman, Wilful and Wanton Conduct in Automobile Guest Cases, 13 IND. L.J. 131, 148-51
(1937), for an earlier discussion of this idea as it applies in automobile guest statute cases.
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less parties should bear the entire brunt of their loss because their conduct
approximates intent, and (b) The extent to which the jurisdiction's com-
parative fault scheme exists to apportion liability equitably according to fault.
a. Policies Underlying the Recklessness Doctrine
The advent of the recklessness doctrine occurred in large measure as a
reaction to the inequity of the contributory negligence bar.'65 The courts
needed some rationale for allowing recovery in cases in which a negligent
plaintiff sued a reckless defendant-something more than a mere assertion
that precluding recovery was unfair. Thus was born the conception that reck-
lessness differed in kind from ordinary negligence. Courts apparently felt
much more comfortable fastening a reckless defendant with total liability once
they had discovered that his fault was not only more severe, but also was of
an entirely different order than negligence.
Based on this historical analysis, it might be argued that the kind-degree
distinction is but an anachronistic vestige of a legal fiction that has ceased to
serve a useful purpose under modern systems of comparative fault. With the
adoption of comparative fault, the inequity of the contributory negligence bar,
and therefore the rationale for the different-kind-of-fault fiction, arguably has
disappeared. Indeed, this view is the basis of the approach taken by many of
the courts viewing recklessness as negligence differing from ordinary negli-
gence only in degree. 66
Alternatively, some authorities have suggested a second reason for both
the adoption and the retention of the recklessness doctrine: a judgment that
the reckless party's state of mind so closely approximates intent that he
should be treated in the same manner as one guilty of an intentional tort-he
should not have the benefit of using his opponent's contributory negligence to
mitigate his liability. 67 As Professor Schwartz has observed, when both of
these rationales underlie a recklessness system in a particular jurisdiction, the
adoption of comparative fault eliminates the first one-amelioration of the
severity of contributory negligence. The second rationale, however, re-
mains-a judgment that complete liability should attach to parties whose state
of mind is felt so closely to approximate intent that they should not be accord-
ed the opportunity to use their opponents' contributory negligence to mitigate
their liability.' 68 Indeed, a few of the courts adhering to the conception that
negligence differs from recklessness in kind have used this proximity-to-intent
165. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 5.3, at 105. See also H. WOODS, supra note 17, § 1:6.
166. See, e.g., Amoco Pipeline v. Montgomery, 487 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (see supra text
accompanying notes 107-15); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. State, 115 Cal. App. 3d 116, 171 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct.
App. 1981) (see supra text accompanying notes 145-46).
167. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 34, at 184--85; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 5.3, at 105.
168. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 5.3, at 105.
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analysis as a principal element of their decisions. 69 The rationale for continu-
ing to use the proximity-to-intent formulation embodies considerations of
judicial economy, deterrence, 170  and perhaps even an element of retribu-
tion. 7'
On the recklessness side of the equation, then, the court must weigh two
possibly conflicting elements. To the extent that recklessness is seen as exist-
ing solely to mitigate the harshness of contributory negligence, the doctrine
has no further utility once comparative fault is adopted, and therefore, it
should be discarded. To the extent, however, that recklessness is seen as
embodying a judgment that the actor's state of mind so closely approximates
intent that he ought to bear the total loss, retention of recklessness as an
all-or-nothing doctrine may be appropriate.
b. Policies Underlying the Adoption of Comparative Fault
After fully considering the reasons for the existence of recklessness in the
jurisdiction and determining the extent to which it is grounded on a proximity-
to-intent rationale, courts confronting the recklessness issue next should
examine the policies underlying the adoption of comparative fault in the juris-
diction.
Unfortunately, in most jurisdictions there exists little in the way of legis-
lative history to suggest the reasons that comparative fault systems were
adopted.' 72 In many instances, therefore, the courts will be forced to use their
common-law authority to interpret the existing legislation (or judicial opinions
adopting comparative fault) in light of what they believe were or should have
been the reasons for the adoption of comparative fault.
To the extent that comparative fault was adopted or continues to exist to
apportion loss equitably according to the relative degrees of fault that caused
it, recklessness (arguably a subset of fault) should be compared with ordinary
negligence (clearly fault). If, on the other hand, it appears clear that the
adoption of comparative fault in the jurisdiction did not carry with it a judg-
ment that liability ought to be apportioned according to degrees of fault caus-
169. See, e.g., Draney v. Bachman, 138 N.J. Super. 503, 351 A.2d 409 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (see
supra text accompanying notes 58-65); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763, 602 P.2d 605 (1979) (see supra text
accompanying notes 76-93).
170. Professor Schwartz' observation (endorsed by the California Supreme Court in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
13 Cal. 3d 804, 825-26, 532 P.2d 1226, 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 873 (1975)), that the loss of any deterrent effect
occasioned by the adoption of comparative fault would be slight (see V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 5.3, at 103)
is a cogent one. Assuming that the deterrence element is less than crucial, the relevant policy factors become
judicial economy and retribution.
171. "Retribution" is used here to connote the equivalent of "getting back at" a reckless party out of a
sense of indignation or outrage at his conduct. It is analogous to the "moral factors" formulation employed by
the California Court of Appeals in Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (Ct. App. 1976)
(see supra text accompanying notes 124-36). Although not applied particularly well in that case, the idea that
recovery might be denied when it simply shocks the conscience of a reasonable man has some merit and should
be considered.
172. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 5.3, at 107.
[Vol. 43:399
COMPARATIVE FAULT
ing it, comparison of recklessness with ordinary negligence may be less ap-
propriate.
One factor that should be examined at this stage as indicative of intent to
assess liability in proportion to fault is the extent to which the system, given
its history and judicial interpretation, appears truly to be a system of com-
parative fault rather than exclusively a system of comparative negligence.
173
To the extent that the system is one of comparative fault, it is much more
appropriate that recklessness be compared with ordinary negligence. Indica-
tions that the system is in fact one that compares fault (a broader term than
negligence), rather than merely negligence, include the use of the word
"fault" in the statute, judicial pronouncements, or legislative history, as well
as the prior application of the jurisdiction's comparative negligence scheme to
other types of conduct-notably strict liability-that clearly are not neg-
ligence-based.
c. The Solution: A Balancing of Possibly Conflicting Policies
After considering the reasons underlying the adoption of comparative
fault in the jurisdiction, the court should balance these against the policies
underlying the jurisdiction's recklessness doctrine. In the process the court
should avoid to whatever extent possible labeling recklessness as differing in
kind or degree from ordinary negligence.
On the recklessness side of the equation, the element militating in favor
of the comparison of recklessness with ordinary negligence is the extent to
which the jurisdiction's recklessness doctrine exists to mitigate the harshness
of contributory negligence and has been rendered obsolete by the adoption of
comparative fault. The element militating against comparison is the extent to
which the recklessness doctrine carries with it a judgment that the reckless
party's state of mind so closely approximates intent that he should bear the
totality of the loss. On the comparative fault side of the equation, the element
militating in favor of comparisons between recklessness and ordinary negli-
gence is the extent to which the jurisdiction's comparative fault system exists
to assess liability equitably in proportion to the contributing fault. The
element militating against comparison on this side is the extent to which the
jurisdiction's comparative fault system may have been created for some other
inconsistent purpose.
Ultimately, it is a balancing of these two sets of policies, in the event they
conflict, that should produce a well-reasoned decision as to the appropriate
future role of recklessness within the context of a particular jurisdiction's
system of comparative fault.
173. See supra note I for a description of the distinction between comparative negligence and comparative
fault.
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3. A Possible Alternative
One alternative to the retention of recklessness for certain types of par-
ticularly egregious fault-one that would allow a court to relegate the kind
distinction to the judicial junk heap while precluding the use of the judicial
system by certain very reckless parties-would be to declare the conduct in
question to be intentional, rather than reckless. This approach, of necessity,
would rely heavily on the definition of intent employed by the drafters of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 8A of the Restatement defines
intent as a state of mind whereby "the actor desires to cause consequences of
his act, or ... believes that the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it. "174 While this formulation does differ in significant ways from
the Restatement's definition of recklessness,'75 it is sufficiently broad that
courts could employ it effectively to deny recovery to certain parties seen as
being guilty of egregiously reckless conduct. 76
The advantage of employing this alternative is that only certain highly
reckless parties would be denied the opportunity to have their fault compared.
Other much less guilty parties still could take advantage of comparative fault,
even though a fact finder, using what often is a very nebulous instruction,
had labeled their conduct "reckless."
VII. CONCLUSION
An examination of judicial attempts to define the proper role of reckless-
ness in American systems of comparative fault reveals the significant con-
fusion and disagreement that surround the issue. Much of the problem stems
from a tendency on the part of courts dealing with the issue to rely in con-
clusory fashion on prior case law establishing artificial distinctions between
negligence and recklessness based on conceptions that the two forms of con-
duct differ in kind or degree. At least some of the confusion in this area would
be removed if courts would eliminate the kind-degree distinction from their
judicial vocabulary and focus instead on the policies underlying recklessness
and comparative fault.
A court dealing with the recklessness issue first should address the thresh-
old issues of the existence of dispositive legislation or legislative history and
the various considerations raised by the identity of the allegedly reckless
party (plaintiff, defendant, or both). Next, the court should balance the poli-
cies underlying the jurisdiction's recklessness doctrine against those underly-
ing the jurisdiction's adoption of comparative fault. In balancing these poli-
cies, the court first should consider whether the recklessness doctrine in the
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (emphasis added).
175. See id. § 500.
176. This is not to suggest that this determination be made as a matter of law. Certainly, jury instructions
embodying the Restatement approach easily could be formulated.
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jurisdiction appears to exist to ameliorate the severity of the contributory
negligence rule (in which case it no longer serves a purpose under compar-
ative fault and comparison should be allowed) or whether it reflects a judg-
ment that the reckless party's conduct so closely resembles intent that he
should not have the benefit of contributory negligence (in which case con-
tinuation of the all-or-nothing effect of recklessness may be appropriate).
Second, the court should consider the extent to which, in its judgment, the
system of comparative fault in the jurisdiction exists to apportion liability
according to fault. To the extent that this is judged to be the aim of the
jurisdiction's comparative fault scheme, the comparison of recklessness with
ordinary negligence will be increasingly appropriate.
Jim Hasenfus

